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1. In troduction 
O n January 22, 2009, President Obama issued three executive orders man-dating, among other things, a review of US detention policy, a review of US 
interrogation policy, and the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility as 
soon as practicable and, in any case, within a year of the order. With these orders, 
the President ensured that the US government would revisit a whole range of do-
mestic and international legal positions governing its use of force against al Qaeda 
and the Taliban. two groups with which it has been engaged in armed conflict since 
late 200 1. 
One issue which the new administration may have occasion to consider in the 
context of the above-mentioned reviews, and as it contemplates further military 
engagement in Afghanistan, is the question of which body of international law gov-
erns the use of force by the United States in extraterritorial armed conflicts-and, 
in particular , whether the governing international legal regime is the law of armed 
conflict, human rights law or some combination of the two. In this area, the new 
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administration will be working against a backdrop of a US government position 
that was vigorously advanced by (though in many respects it did not originate 
with) the Bush administration to the effect that US human rights obligations do 
not apply to actions arising in extraterri torial armed conflicts, both because of 
treaty-based territorial limitations and because of the doctrine of lex specialis. 
Given the work that lies ahead, it seems a useful moment to pause and revisit 
some of the key legal and policy arguments advanced by the Bush administration 
and in some cases its allies or other commentators in this sensitive area. The pur-
pose of this article is not either to advocate or criticize these arguments or to offer a 
view about whether departure from them is legally available. Instead, it is to lay 
down a marker on where the prior administration and like-minded participants in 
the discussion of these issues stood as the transition to a new US administration ap-
proached. As discussed in greater detail below, the arguments advanced by this 
group drew from, among other things, a combination of observations about (I ) 
historical US positions on the territorial limitations of human rights obligations, 
(2) uncertainty in international case law about the extent to which human rights 
obligations extend into extraterritorial anned-conflict situations and (3) practical 
challenges faced by European allies operating within a human rights legal frame-
work in Afghanistan. 
II. Overview: General Legal Framework for Military Operations against al 
Qaeda and the Taliban as 0/2008 
By way of background, it is useful to review the legal framework in which the 
United States conducted military operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban in 
2008. Between 2001 and 2008, the primary legal basis for the US government's use 
of force against these groups remained largely the same, while the legal framework 
for its treatment of detainees changed dramatically (with all three branches of gov-
ernment taking steps to provide additional measures of protection to detainees). 
The US government's approach to diplomacy concerning these issues changed as 
well, with an increasing emphasis after 2004 on outreach to European and other 
close allies to seek common ground on the international legal framework concern-
ing the use offorce against transnational terrorists. But despite important legal and 
policy changes during this period, including the US Supreme Court's 2008 deci-
sion in Boumediene v. Bush, I which recognized the right of Guantanamo detainees 
to challenge the legality of their detentions in US courts (albeit on constitutional 
rather than human rights law grounds), the United States maintained its legal posi-
tion with respect to the non-application of its human rights obligations to extrater-
ritorial armed conflicts. 
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From 200 1 through 2008, the basis for operations rested on the premise that 
the United States was in an armed conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban in Af-
ghanistan-a conflict arising out of a series of attacks against the United States, 
culminating in the attacks of September 11, 2001, to which the United States re-
sponded in self-defense as notified to the UN Security Council in October 200 1.2 
During the ensuing seven years, US operations were divided between two coali-
tions. Some US fo rces fought as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), a 
US-led coalition that operated with the consent of the post-Taliban elected gov-
ernment in Afghanistan.3 Others fought under the auspices of the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-a NATO-led coalition that operated both with 
the consent of the Afghan government and under a UN Security Council man-
date.4 As a result, the legal basis for US operations in Afghanistan might be de-
scribed as "self-defense plus," with the "plus" being consent of the Afghan 
government and, in the ISAF case, a UN Security Council mandate. As a matter of 
domestic law, Congress recognized the US government's right to use force in self-
defense in its Authorization to Use Military Force dated September 18,2001," and 
the Supreme Court confirmed its right to detain combatants as an incident of its 
right to use fo rce in its Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision in 2004.6 
Questions about how to classify the conflict, and what protections detainees 
should receive, were the source of more pronounced movement in the law. The 
initial position of the US government at the beginning of the fighting in Afghani-
stan was to treat the conflicts with both groups as international in character, given 
that neither was limited to a conflict within the territory of a single State, but to 
deny detainees captured in the conflicts protections under the Geneva Conven-
tions/ With respect to the Taliban, the US government concluded that the conflict 
was governed by Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions! because the 
Taliban qualified as a high contracting party to the Conventions (in light ofits gov-
erning role in Afghanistan ), but that Taliban fighters did not meet the criteria set 
forth in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. President Bush determined that 
Taliban detainees accordingly would not benefit from prisoner of war protections. 
As concerns al Qaeda, the US government concluded that because the group was 
not a high contracting party to the Geneva Conventions, it was not eligible for any 
protections under those treaties. In the case of both groups, the US government 
took the position that Common Article 39 was inapplicable, because it governed 
only conflicts of a non-international character. 10 
In 2006, the landscape shifted when the Supreme Court heJd in Hamdan v. 
Rllmsfe1d that the conflict with al Qaeda is of a non-international character and 
that Common Article 3 accordingly applies as a matter of treaty law. II While 
Hamdan did not speak to the legal protections that apply with respect to the 
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Taliban, the Department of Defense issued, in the same year, a detainee directive 
that applied Common Article 3 and additional protections as a baseline to all De-
partment of Defense detention operations. These protections were in addition to 
certain administrative procedures that the Department of Defense created through 
separate mechanisms to review whether detainees were being properly detained as 
combatants and, on a periodic basis, whether they posed a threat sufficient to merit 
continued detention.12 
In 2008, the Supreme Court determined in Boumediene v. Bush that the Com-
batant Status Review Tribunals created for purposes ofGuantanamo status reviews 
were not an adequate and effective substitute for the ab ility to seek the writ of 
habeas corpus, and that Guantanamo detainees have a constitutional right to con-
test the legality of their detentions in a habeas proceeding in US courts. i3 It re-
mained unclear, however, whether the federal courts would extend habeas rights to 
detention operations at facilities such as Bagram in Afghanistan where the US gov-
ernment exercises control short of the total and indefinite control the Court 
deemed it to enjoy at Guantanamo.14 
While the courts were changing the legal landscape, the US government was 
working to change the diplomatic landscape. Following the 2004 election, the prior 
administration began to expand its outreach to foreig n governments on detention-
related issues, responding in part to a recommendation by the 9/11 Commission 15 
that the United States should engage its allies to develop a common framework for 
the treatment and detention of terrorists. A major theme of this outreach effort was 
to underscore that the international legal framework governing military opera-
tions, and in particular detention operations, in extraterritorial non-international 
armed conflict was underdeveloped. Department of State Legal Adviser John Bel-
linger argued that among the fundamental issues that the law of armed conflict 
failed to address were questions about whom a State could hold as enemy 
belligerents, what sort of status determination procedures detainees should re-
ceive, how to determine when the end of conflict had arrived such that detainees 
must be released, and what sort of"non-refoulement" style protections should apply 
to the transfer or release of detainees outside a State's territol)'.1 6 
The US government under the prior administration argued that these ungov-
erned areas in the law of armed conflict presented troubling areas of uncertainty 
for the US government, its allies and its courts (all of which had reason to be con-
cerned about the conduct of detention operations in the absence of clear legal guid-
ance) . But the government nevertheless resisted the position-advanced by 
human rights advocates, the International Committee of the Red Cross and others-
that human rights law did or should present a legal basis for filling them. While the 
US government agreed that consideration should be given as to how the legal 
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framework governing non-international armed conflict should be expanded, it 
also maintained that an across-the-board acceptance of the application ofhwnan 
rights principles in conflict was not required by law and was to some extent unreal-
istic as a matter of policy. 17 The balance of this article describes certain legal and 
practical arguments that the prior administration (and in some cases its allies) ad-
vanced in support of this position. 
III. Legal Arguments 
This section highlights three of the arguments that the prior administration---or, 
in one case, the government of Canada-advanced in support of its legal position 
concerning the territorial limitations of certain human rights obligations. One ar-
gument the US government advanced was that both the text and the negotiating 
history of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights l8 (which, as the 
most comprehensive articulation of relevant human r ights obligations to which 
the United States is party, was the focus of much of the debate in this area ) indi-
cated that it was only intended to apply within a State's own territory. Another ar-
gument was that even States purporting to apply the law of armed conflict and 
human rights law conjointly to extraterri torial armed conflicts did not appear to 
have a clear understanding about how to balance certain fundamental tensions be-
tween the two bodies oflaw. A third relevant argument-advanced in litigation be-
tween the Canadian government and Amnesty International-was that certain key 
decisions by foreign courts and international tribunals reflected a persistent uncer-
tainty about whether and to what extent human rights law should apply in extra-
territorial armed conflicts. 
A. Text and History 
The prior administration's positions with respect to the text and history of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were thoroughly explored in the 
US government's 2005 report to the UN Human Rights Committee (the body of 
experts who review treaty reports under the Covenant)l9 and elsewhere.2o The ar-
guments begin with the text of Article 2, which provides that a State party will apply 
the Covenant to persons "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction." While 
overtime commentators, including Thomas Buergenthal,21 the UN Committee on 
Human Rights, and some courts developed arguments that Article 2 should be in-
terpreted to mean that obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights apply to a State's conduct toward persons who are either in its terri-
tory or subject to its jurisdiction, the US government continued to take the view 
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that the plainest reading of the text is that both terri tory and jurisdiction require-
ments must be met in order for the Covenant to apply. 
Moreover, the US government took the position-for example, in its observa-
tions to the UN Committee on Human Rights' General Comment 3 I-that, to the 
extent it was necessary to look beyond the text of Article 2 to the travaux 
priparatoires to clarify the intent of the framers in drafting the provision, the 
travaux fully supported the US government perspective on the scope of the Cove-
nant.22 Here, the US government noted that Eleanor Roosevelt and the US team 
negotiating the Covenant had insisted on the reference to "territoty" in Article 2 
because they did not believe it would be practicable to apply the guarantees of the 
Covenant extraterritorially-specifically in situations of occupation.23 The US del-
egation encountered resistance from certain other delegations, which tried to 
amend the operative language that constrained the application of the Covenant to 
a State's own territory, but the US position prevailed.24 By way of context, com-
mentators have noted that the post-war environment in which the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was framed was one in which much of the 
international community saw the law of armed conflict and human rights law as 
coming from different sources and occupying different spheres-with human 
rights law being derived from enlightenment-era principles about the affirmative 
rights of individuals vis-a.-vis their governments, and the law of armed conflict be-
ing a mostly restrictive set of principles reflecting a grand bargain among States 
about the proper balance of military necessity against humanitarian limits.25 
The prior administration also noted that, while certain other governments and 
international bodies had subsequently accepted a broader interpretation of the 
scope of application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the US government's position had been consistent across decades and administra-
tions-and had been advanced not only by Mrs. Roosevelt at the time the Cove-
nant was negotiated but also by State Department Legal Adviser Conrad Harper in 
the first US report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 1995.26 
B. The Nuclear WeaponslWall Conundrum 
One of the key sources of the position that human rights law and the law of armed 
conflict apply conjointly in the context of international armed conflict is a 1996 ad-
visoryopinion of the International Court of Justice, the so-called Nuclear Weapons 
advisory opinion. In that opinion the ICJ wrote as follows: 
The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant [onJ Civil and 
Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the 
Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national 
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emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle. 
the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The test of 
what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be detennined by the 
applicable lex specialis, namely. the law applicable in anned conflict which is designed 
to regulate the conduct ofhostilitiesF 
Several years later, in its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Con-
struction ofa Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the IC} reinforced and elab-
orated on its Nuclear Weapons holding as follows: 
More generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights 
conventions does not cease in case of anned conflict, save through the effect of 
provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A$ regards the relationship between 
international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible 
situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; 
others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of 
both these branches of intemationallaw. In order to answer the question put to it, the 
Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of international law, 
namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.28 
When these two IC} passages are read together, the key principles that emerge ap-
pear to be that ( I ) human rights law continues to apply in armed conflict; (2) in 
armed conflict, some rights may be governed by human rights law, some by the law 
of armed conflict, and some by both; and (3) when a human rights rule is in con-
flict with a law of armed conflict rule, the law of armed conflict takes precedence as 
lex specialis.29 
In reflecting on whether tensions between human rights law and the law of 
armed conflict could be reconciled by applying these or other principles, the prior 
administration noted that reconciliation might be achieved in some cases, but 
would be difficult if not impossible in others. One area where it acknowledged that 
the two bodies might be reconciled concerns the right not to be arbitrarily deprived 
of one's life, as set forth in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.30 Here, the US government's analysis tracked that of the IC}, 
which discussed the application of Article 6 in armed conflict in the above-quoted 
language from its Nuclear Weapons opinion. The IC} found that in armed conflict, 
Article 6 continues to apply, but that a deprivation of life would not be deemed ar-
bitrary fo r purposes of Article 6 if it occurred in a manner that complied with the 
law of armed conflict (i.e., in a manner consistent with the principles of propor-
tionalityand distinction, and that did not run afoul of any other treaty or custom-
ary international law rule) . The Nuclear Weapons discussion of Article 6 does not 
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make entirely clear whether the law of armed conflict rule displaces the human 
rights rule (suggesting that in cases where there is a violation the remedy is limited 
to what is afforded under the law of armed conflict) or whether it more accurately 
gives content to a human rights rule while the two rules apply simultaneously (sug-
gesting that where there is a violation the individual is accountable under both hu-
man rights law and the law of armed conflict). It does, however, make dear that 
action consistent with the law of armed conflict is not a human rights violation. 
But the prior administration also suggested that commentators calling for the 
joint application ofhwnan rights law and the law of armed conflict had failed to 
give meaningful guidance on how to achieve reconciliation between the two bodies 
of law where the tension between them is more nuanced-for example, on the issue 
of whether an individual detained in armed conflict may seek review of detention 
in court. Here, the Geneva Conventions do not offer procedures by which combat-
ants may challenge the legality of their detentions, either in international or non-
international armed conflict. By contrast, Article 9 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights prohibits arbitral)' detention and provides a right of 
review for all prisoners and detainees. A question that accordingly presents itself is 
whether the absence of a procedure for judicial review of detentions under the 
Geneva Conventions suggests that the law of armed conflict is not, on this point, 
the lex specialis, leaving human rights law to furnish the relevant rule. In reflecting 
on this issue, US Legal Adviser lohn Bellinger asked: 
Would it be practical to expect States detaining tens of thousands of unprivileged 
combatants in a non-international armed conflict to bring them before a judge without 
delay? This is not something States must do even for prisoners of war under the Third 
Geneva Convention. If the answer is that the State should derogate from Article 9 if the 
exigencies of a civil war sodemand, then what contribution has human rights law made 
to answering questions regarding the procedures owed combatants in non-
international armed conflict? 31 
An area of similarly subtle tension between the two bodies oflaw concerns the 
principle of "'non-refoulement." Under hwnan rights law, the principle of non-
refoulement (memorialized in Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, lnhwnan or Degrading Treatment or Punishmentn and elsewhere) 
provides a safeguard against the transfer of individuals to situations where they are 
likely to be tortured. As Legal Adviser Bellinger noted, however, the law of armed 
conflict provides for no such protection with respect to the transfer of prisoners of 
war and other detainees at the end of an armed conflict.33 While in practice the prior 
administration looked to human rights law to guide its transfer policy with respect to 
individuals detained in the conflict with aI Qaeda (for example, it established a firm 
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policy against transferring Guantanamo detainees to countries where it determined 
they were more likely than not to be tortured}, Bellinger noted the complications 
that arose as a result, obseIVing that "[t[his policy, central as it is to Western values, 
has meant that dozens of detainees who cannot be repatriated ... have remained at 
Guantanamo for years after we have wished to transfer them."}4 
In a similar vein , the prior administration's pleadings in Munaf v. Geren 
also pointed to certain sovereignty-related complications that may arise 
through the application of human rights non-refoulement principles in armed 
conflict-particularly when one State is conducting hostilities against a non-State 
actor on another State's territory. In Munaf v. Geren, the US government argued 
that the Supreme Court should deny the relief sought by two American citizens 
held in Iraq, who had requested that the Court enjoin the US government from 
turning them over to the government of Iraq for prosecution, because of their 
concerns about post-transfer mistreatment.3s In ruling fo r the government, the 
Court appeared to weigh human rights considerations-noting, among other 
things, the US government's statement that it had a policy not to transfer individ-
uals in cases where torture would likely result- but also appeared to place greater 
emphasis on Iraq's legitimate sovereign interest in bringing to justice individuals 
accused of committing crimes on its territory. The Court wrote that 
because Omar and Munaf [the two prisoners} are being held by United States Armed 
Forces at the behest of the Iraqi Government pending their prosecution in Iraqi 
courts ... release of any kind [as opposed to transferring the detainees to Iraqi custody] 
would interfere with the sovereign authority of Iraq "to punish offenses against its laws 
committed within its borders."36 
In this passage, the Court highlighted one of the quandaries that a State may face 
when it seeks to apply its human rights standards on the territory of another State 
and accordingly appeared to echo the concern expressed by the US delegation that 
negotiated the text of Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights-Le., that it might not be possible for States to enforce their human rights 
obligations outside their sovereign territory. 
C. Uncertain Litigation Landscape 
Another relevant argument-this one successfully advanced by the Canadian gov-
ernment in its litigation with Amnesty International-was that international legal 
precedent concerning the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations 
in armed conflict is unsettled, and that to the extent it supports the extraterritorial 
application of human rights obligations, it does so only in limited cases.37 
533 
Human Rights Obligations, Armed Conflict and Afghanistan 
The Canadian government advanced this argument in defending a lawsuit 
brought by Amnesty International. Amnesty had sued Canada under the Canadian 
Charter38 to prevent it from transferring detainees captured in Afghanistan to 
Afghan custody, because of non -refoulement concerns. Because the question of 
whether the Canadian Charter applies extraterritorially turns in part on the question 
of whether Canada's international human rights obligations apply in Afghanistan, 
the Canadian government's pleadings explored foreign and international case law 
concerning the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations. In its 
pleadings, the Canadian government observed that the Grand Chamber of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights had ruled in its Batlkovic390pinion of2001 that the 
scope of the European Convention on Human Rights40 is normally confmed to the 
territorial limits of the Convention's contracting States. While Batlkovic acknowl-
edged that the European Convention on Human Rights applies extraterritorially in 
certain cases (e.g., where the conduct in question occurs in a State's embassies, 
consulates. airplanes or vessels. and in cases where a State exercises some or all of the 
public powers in the territory of another State) the Court ruled that no such addi-
tional basis existed in the context of a NATO bombing raid on a Serbian radio station 
that killed sixteen people.41 
The Canadian trial court hearing the case acknowledged that several subse-
quent European Court of Human Rights cases appeared to go considerably fur-
ther than Batlkovic on the question of when the European Convention on Human 
Rights applies extraterritorially (e.g., by finding that the Convention may apply 
when a contracting State has effective control over a particular person outside its 
own borders. regardless of whether it controls the territory where that person is 
being held) but took the position that these cases do not take precedence over the 
Grand Chamber's decision in Batlkovic.42 In ruling for the Canadian government. 
the court concluded that as a whole the body of jurisprudence relating to the ex-
traterritorial application of human rights law appeared "uncertain,"43 and that the 
Charter accordingly did not confer rights on Afghans detained by Canadian forces 
in Afghanistan.44 
IV. Practical Issues: Afghanistan 
Moving from law to practice, commentators observing ISAF/NATO operations in 
Afghanistan noted certain practical concerns arising from the application of hu-
man rights obligations in extraterri torial armed conflict. 
One concern relates to operational constraints that human rights law imposes 
on combat operations. In May 2008. a European news magazine reported that a 
European partner in the ISAf coalition had failed to capture a Taliban leader who 
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was believed by NATO commanders to be active in planting roadside bombs and 
sheltering suicide bombers, and to be responsible for a 2007 attack on a sugar fac-
tory that had resulted in almost eighty deaths. When an effort to capture this indi-
vidual failed, the coalition partner's troops had an opportunity to target him, but 
had to pull back because they lacked the authorization to do so, permitting him to 
flee. A senior official from this coalition partner explained to the magazine that "a 
fugitive like [the escaped Taliban leader[ is not an aggressor and should not be shot 
unless necessary."4S The magazine additionally reported that this coalition partner 
considered "[t[he use of lethal force [to bel prohibited unless an attack is taking 
place or is imminent."46 The emphasis on using force only in self-defense suggested 
that either the coalition partner did not believe itself to be engaged in an armed 
conflict, or that it had nevertheless instructed its troops to act in accordance with a 
human rights law framework and treat its Afghan operations as a law enforcement 
exercise. The magazine noted that this coalition partner considered the different 
approaches by its allies to targeting in Afghanistan as "not being in conformity with 
international law" and suggested that the difference in legal approaches contrib-
uted to "tension and friction" among NATO partners.47 The magazine's account 
accordingly suggested that the application of human rights law may impede effec-
tive military operations both by limiting the scope of operational flexibility where 
applied to the exclusion oflaw of armed conflict principles and by creating coordi-
nation issues between coalition partners. 
A second concern that has been raised by commentators is that the discrepancy 
between US and European approaches to detention may be partly responsible for 
having impaired the ability of NATOIISAF to conduct effective detention opera-
tions. Under a rule that applies to all NATOIISAF forces (including US compo-
nents under NATOIISAF command), forces are generally prohibited from holding 
detainees for longer than ninety-six hours before transferring them to Afghan au-
thorities.48 This system avoids legal and other complications that might arise out of 
meruum- or long-term detention, particularly for States that might face challenges 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, but it has its costs. In 2006, 
David Bosco, a senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine, wrote that, as a result of 
this system, 
NATO troops have no system in place fo r regularly interrogating Taliban fighters for 
intelligence purposes. Whenever possible, they let the Afghan troops they operate with 
take custody. When that's not possible, they house their prisoners briefly in makeshift 
facilities while they arrange a transfer to the Afghans. NATO guidelines call for the 
handover of prisoners within 96 hours, far too brief a time for soldiers to even know 
whom they're holding. And once prisoners are in Afghan hands, international forces 
easily lose track of them.49 
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Human rights advocates such as Amnesty International have also criticized the 
ninety-six-hour rule-from a different angle-arguing that it actually creates 
human rights concerns, because it requires the transfer of detainees to Afghan au-
thorities notwithstanding what Amnesty has argued to be an unacceptable risk of 
mistreatment. Indeed, it was concern about NATO/ISAF transfer policies that led 
Amnesty to bring the above-described lawsuit seeking to enjoin the government of 
Canada from transferring detainees to Afghan custody pending an improvement 
in post-transfer human rights safeguards. 
v. Conclusion 
As discussed, the prior administration took the view that the law of armed conflict 
did not provide an adequate legal framework for addressing all of the issues that 
arise in armed conflict with non-State groups, but argued that legal and policy con-
siderations weighed against the notion that gaps in the framework should be filled 
simply by looking to human rights law. Instead, it emphasized that the interna-
tional community needed to work together to develop new approaches that would 
address the gaps while steering clear of the legal and policy pitfalls it associated with 
the application of human rights law in armed conflict.50 The new administration 
will, of course, develop its own views about where the gaps lie and how to address 
them. In determining whether or how to depart from the path taken by the prior 
administration, a firs t step will be to look back at some of the arguments and con-
cerns described in this article and elsewhere that helped to put the US government 
on its present course. 
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